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1 OVERVIEW 
Much of the philosophical discussion of explanations has centered around two broad 
conceptions of what sorts of ‘things’ explanations are, descriptive and objective. Proponents of 
each agree upon one thing: Psychology can contribute little to the study of explanations. They 
attempt to show this by pointing to cases of explanation where the commonly associated 
phenomenology of explanation (CAPE) (e.g., feelings of insight or understanding) is absent and 
cases where the CAPE is present without any explanations. All such arguments improperly 
exploit the ambiguity of ‘explanation’, but they do contain a kernel of truth. The CAPE is, in 
fact, not constitutive of explanation, not even in the oft-overlooked (third) psychological sense of 
the term. What appears to be essential is that one finds a happening intelligible. Here I propose a 
model of the psychological underpinnings of intelligibility and, ultimately, of what explanations 
are (in the psychological sense). I close by outlining how the psychological study of 
intelligibility may actually help to reveal the origins of all three concepts of explanation and, in 
turn, the origins of the judgments about explanation that have in large measure driven 
philosophical theorizing on the subject. 
2 ECHOES OF HEMPEL 
The study of explanations became a going concern in Anglo-American philosophy in the 
mid-20th century logical positivism was on the decline. To paint with broad strokes, positivistic 
philosophers of science sought to brand science as an institutional source of knowledge that is 
(unlike religion, astrology, and large swaths of philosophy) devoid of meaningless metaphysical 
speculations. The major sticking point was claims about theoretical goings-on (e.g., electrons), 
but positivists maintained that these claims could be straightforwardly ‘reduced,’ using the tools 
of formal logic, to claims about the observations that would confirm them. But there is, of 
course, much more to theoretical claims than meets the eye. They are typically linked in complex 
ways to, among other things, lots of other theoretical claims. The upshot is that even if a 
theoretical claim about a system were accurate, altering the system in a certain way would still 
not always yield the expected outcome. Theoretical claims make, it came to be acknowledged, 
do make assertions about happenings unseen, and in this way they also serve an important 
retrospective function: They provide explanations for how and why observed happenings unfold 
the way they do. 
2.1 Hempel’s Anti-psychologism 
Carl Hempel’s seminal work on explanation appeared in the wake of the positivistic 
obsession with the prediction of observables. According to Hempel (1965), science is the product 
of two basic human motives. One is mankind’s practical desire to improve his life through 
foresight and control over nature. Here predictive leverage is clearly quite important. The other is 
to be found in “his sheer intellectual curiosity, in his deep and persistent desire to know and to 
understand himself and his world” (333). This requires explanations. Hempel’s own interest in 
explanation stems from a similar motive, from his deep and persistent desire to know and to 
understand, “What is the nature of the explanations empirical sciences can provide? What 
understanding of empirical phenomena do they convey?” (333). This is what might be called an 
ontological motive. According to Hempel, it could be served by examining the “form and 
function” of the various kinds of explanation provided by science (333). In addition, like most 
philosophers of science, Hempel views the scientific method of proposing and evaluating 
explanations as an exemplary way of gaining knowledge of the world. Determining how, on its 
best day, science determines whether an explanation is “true” or, as he puts it, merely “potential” 
(338) – for Hempel all genuine explanations are accurate – serves what might be called his 
epistemological motive. 
Hempel undertook to study explanation by abstracting by abstracting from people engage 
in the act of explaining happenings to one another and from the psychological states that may 
result therefrom. In the footsteps of his positivist predecessors, he would abstract as well from 
the specific contents involved and try to discern the bare logical form of explanations utilizing 
the tools of formal logic. Hempel believed that just as major advances were made in proof theory 
through a similar double abstraction, major advances in the study of explanation, and science 
more generally, can be expected in this way as well. Hempel (1965) purports that a major 
success story for this approach was the demonstration that theoretical claims can be Ramsified 
(414-5). In this way, it was hoped, one could acknowledge the full complexity of theoretical 
claims and their essential reference to matters unseen and supply a reconstructions of their 
meanings in observational and paralogical terms. This achievement was made possible, says 
Hempel, “only by reference to a precisely formulated, and to some extent schematic, conception 
of scientific explanation” (415). 
In any case, the eventual outcome of Hempel’s double abstraction was covering-law 
model of explanation. On this view, an explanation is an argument, which comprises statements 
describing one or more laws and (in some cases) particular conditions which imply, in ways that 
can be captured by the principles of inductive and deductive logic, a statement describing the 
target happening. In this way, an explanation shows that the happening “was to be expected,” 
and thereby it “enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred” (1965, 337).  
Given that Hempel takes understanding to be the driving motive behind the search for 
explanations, one might think that in this respect he is committed to some form of psychologism 
about explanations.1 Hempel was, however, careful to distinguish between genuine 
understanding and the mere sense, or feeling, of understanding. He claims, “it is important to 
distinguish here understanding in the psychological sense of a feeling of empathic familiarity 
from understanding in the theoretical… sense of exhibiting the phenomenon to be explained as a 
special case of some general regularity” (1965, 256-7). This distinction does, in fact, seem to 
reflect our common ways of using the term ‘understanding.’2 In one sense, ‘understand’ is a 
success verb much like (a sense of) ‘see’ – that is to say, in order to do it you must be successful 
at it. We might say, for instance, that whereas alchemists felt that they understood combustion, 
chemists do genuinely understand combustion. Hempel identifies the mere feeling of 
understanding, which as we saw has no success requirement, with feelings of empathy or 
familiarity. These psychological events, he claims, are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
genuine understanding or genuine (‘theoretical’ or ‘scientific’) explanation (257, 430). Whether 
or not something is an explanation does not track these subjective psychological states. 
Something can be an explanation in the absence of these feelings, for sometimes an explanation 
hinges upon an appeal to something unfamiliar, such as when the law of gravitation is used to 
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 In fact, I am inclined to think it does (de Regt 2009; also see Waskan 2006), but that is not where I wish to pitch 
my flag in this essay. 
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 There are, of course, other senses of ‘understanding’ which may or may not have little to do with explanation, as in 
“Eliza does not understand a word of English.” 
explain the behavior of falling bodies (257, 431). And something can evoke these feelings 
without constituting an explanation (257). For instance, that the Scholastic account of the 
behavior of falling bodies appealed to an object’s inner desire to seek it’s natural resting place. 
This clearly appeals to something familiar, but it is, according to Hempel, no explanation at all. 
This line of argument is meant to serve Hempel’s ontological motive, his desire to 
discern what he calls the “essential characteristics” of explanations (1965, 245). Given that 
Hempel equates the feeling of understanding with feelings of empathy or familiarity, we may put 
the central premises of his ontological anti-psychologism argument as follows: 
Psychologistic theories equate explanations with the feeling of understanding (viz., 
feelings of familiarity or empathy). Yet there are clear-cut instances of (descriptive) 
explanation without such feelings, and there are clear-cut instances of such feelings 
without explanation 
The clear-cut instances in question are all descriptive in nature. 
To reinforce his anti-psychologism, Hempel adds the following: “Besides, the extent to 
which an idea will be considered as familiar varies from person to person and from time to time, 
and a psychological factor of this kind certainly cannot serve as a standard of assessing the worth 
of a proposed explanation” (1965, 258). This concerns the epistemological motive of 
determining how we ought to evaluate explanations. We might re-express the central premise of 
Hempel’s epistemic anti-psychologism argument roughly as follows: 
Whether or not a description counts as a good explanation is not determined by what 
subjects feel. 
Hempel’s proposal that explanations are sets of descriptions that bear logical relations to 
one another would be rejected by many for, among other things, its apparent inability to properly 
sort cases of genuine explanation from non-explanations. Better withstanding the test of time, 
however, are his anti-psychologistic arguments and the related assumptions that genuine 
understanding is distinct from the mere feeling of understanding and that genuine explanation 
requires accuracy. One hears echoes of them, for instance, in the works of those who favor more 
mechanism-based theories of explanation. 
2.2 Salmon’s Anti-psychologism 
On mechanistic theories, explanation has not to do not with laws (at least not primarily) 
but with how the parts of a system collectively conspire to produce the happening of interest. 
The mechanistic approach was pioneered in large part by Wesley Salmon, who seems to have co-
opted the aforementioned arguments and assumptions in order to defend what he called an 
“ontic” conception of what, in the most general sense, explanations are. The ontic conception 
was meant as an alternative to Hempel’s “epistemic” conception which took explanation to 
render happenings expectable. In order to understand Salmon’s anti-psychologistic, pro-ontic 
arguments, we must first get clear on what the ontic conception amounts to. Complicating 
matters, Salmon uses ‘ontic’ in two very different ways. 
2.2.1 What is the ontic conception? 
Something that surely motivated Salmon’s introduction of the ontic conception is the fact 
that we often talk of the explanation for a happening, as in, “the explanation for combustion is 
oxidation.” As Craver rightly notes, in this sense of the term, explanations are not the sorts of 
things that are good or bad, right or wrong; “they just are” (2007, 27). Craver appears to view 
this as the right way to understand Salmon’s talk of the ontic conception. He suggests, “Salmon’s 
most penetrating idea was to abandon the idea…that explanations are arguments. Instead, he 
defended an ontic view, according to which explanations are objective features of the world” 
(26-27). Indeed, Salmon does at times seem to favor this purely objective take on what 
explanations are, as, for instance, when he expresses support for Coffa’s view which, says 
Salmon, “located explanations in the external world” (1989, 136). Most interpreters seem to 
agree that this is, in fact, the take-home message of the ontic conception. On this way of 
thinking, in offering up a causal-mechanical theory of explanation Salmon aimed to specify the 
precise sorts of objective facts that make up explanations. 
Glennan (2002), however, offers a different interpretation of ‘ontic’ (also see Henderson 
1995, 80). Glennan claims, “[c]ausal-mechanical explanation exemplifies what Salmon calls the 
ontic conception of explanation. Explanations are not arguments, but are rather descriptions of 
features of a mind-independent reality–—the causal structure of the world” (italics mine, 2002, 
343). One finds support for this interpretation in, for instance, Salmon’s complaint that Hempel 
sometimes slips from the epistemic proposal that explanations render happenings expectable to 
the proposal that they show how happenings fit into an objective “nomic nexus” (1965, 488). 
Salmon (1989) echoes Railton in suggesting that when Hempel slips to the latter view, “the ontic 
conception is being expressed” (120). Says Salmon, the ontic conception would also be 
expressed were Hempel to say, more aptly, that explanations show how happenings “fit into a 
causal nexus” (120). Thus, ontic theories might take many forms, so long as what they propose 
is that explanations (primarily) reveal something about objective states of affairs. This version of 
the ontic conception turns out, however, to concern the “function” or “intellectual value” of 
explanations (135). Explanations are, on this view, representations – objective facts are not in 
the business of revealing. Specifically, they are descriptions. 
Salmon, in fact, explicitly embraces both the objective and the descriptive version of the 
ontic conception: 
Proponents of this conception can speak in either of two ways about the relationship 
between explanations and the world. First, one can say that explanations exist in the 
world…they are neither linguistic entities (sentences) nor abstract entities (propositions). 
Second, the advocate of the ontic conception can say that an explanation is something – 
consisting of sentences or propositions – that reports such facts. It seems to me that either 
way of putting the ontic conception is acceptable… (1989, 86). 
Knowing this puts us in a better position to understand Salmon’s pro-ontic, anti-psychologistic 
arguments. 
2.2.2 Arguments for ‘the’ Ontic Conception 
Like Hempel, Salmon distinguishes between two senses of ‘understanding,’ a 
psychological sense, which involve feelings of intellectual satisfaction and the overcoming of 
psychological uneasiness, and a scientific sense, which involves accurate representations, or 
knowledge (1998, 90). Salmon also offers the following ontological anti-psychologism 
argument, which bears a good deal of resemblance to Hempel’s: 
First, we must surely require that there be some sort of objective relationship between the 
explanatory facts and the fact-to-be-explained. Even if a person were perfectly content 
with an explanation of the occurrence of storms in terms of falling barometric readings, we 
should still say that the behavior of the barometer fails objectively to explain such facts. 
We must, instead, appeal to meteorological conditions (1984, 13). 
The central premises of this argument are roughly as follows: 
Psychologistic theories of explanation equate explanations with feelings of understanding 
(viz., intellectual satisfaction and overcoming uneasiness). Yet there are clear-cut cases of 
(objective) explanation that have nothing to do with such feelings and vice versa. 
The passage then continues as follows, with what looks to be an epistemic anti-
psychologism argument: 
Second, not only is there the danger that people will feel satisfied with scientifically 
defective explanations; there is also the risk that they will be unsatisfied with legitimate 
scientific explanations. A yearning for anthropomorphic explanations of all kinds of 
natural phenomena for example, the demand that every explanation involve conscious 
purposes sometimes leads people to conclude that physics doesn't really explain anything 
at all.... Some people have rejected explanations furnished by general relativity on the 
ground that they cannot visualize a curved four-dimensional space-time (1984, 13). 
The idea appears to be that if we tie explanation too closely to the psychological state of 
intellectual satisfaction, then we risk classifying faulty explanations as good and good 
explanations as faulty. 
Taken together, these arguments are meant to show, the passage concludes, that “[t]he 
psychological interpretation of scientific explanation is patently inadequate” (1984, 13). Instead, 
Salmon favors an ontic conception, though we should bear in mind that in this passage Salmon 
appears to move from the objective version of the ontic conception in the first argument to the 
descriptive version in the second. Explanations in the objective sense are, after all, not the sorts 
of things that can be bad or defective…they just are. Then again, it may be that even descriptive 
explanations cannot, strictly speaking, be bad either for Salmon, for he appears to adopt the 
Hempelian view that where accuracy is lacking, one has at best a “potential” explanation (107). 
Says Salmon, “I would be inclined to say that the truth of [a description] is a necessary condition 
for it to furnish an actual explanation of the explanandum” (108). 
2.3 Craver’s Anti-psychologism 
One latter-day proponent of Salmon’s objective-mechanical ontic conception, Carl 
Craver, appears to share many of these same sentiments. For instance, he claims at the outset of 
Explaing the Brain:  “explanations are not developed merely for the explainer’s intellectual 
satisfaction?[sic.]— the ineffable “a ha” feeling that comes with understanding something. Such 
emotions and feelings are terrible indicators of how well someone understands something…” 
(2007, ix). Later he claims, “The pleasure of understanding is often indistinguishable from the 
pleasure of misunderstanding. The sense of understanding is at best an unreliable indicator of 
quality and depth of an explanation” (2007, 21). This sounds a good deal like the sorts of 
epistemic anti-psychologism arguments considered above. 
Craver favors the objective version of Salmon’s ontic conception and maintains that it 
can, better than any psychological conception of explanation, solve philosophical puzzles (e.g., 
concerned with the relevance of time and causation) related to the sorting of genuine 
explanations from non-explanations. At the end of his critique of Churchland’s psychological 
prototype theory of explanation, he claims:  
A final point serves to underscore the importance of shifting attention away from the 
[cognitive] representations used in explanations and toward the causal structure of the 
world. Some phenomena might be so complex that they overwhelm our limited cognitive 
systems. Perhaps a mechanism has so many parts with so many interactions that it is 
impossible to understand… For this reason, neuroscientists who revel in the complexity 
of the brain are increasingly using computational tools and databases…that allow them to 
make explanatory connections that would escape them if they relied only on their unaided 
cognitive abilities. It would be wrong to say that the phenomena produced by such 
complex mechanisms have no explanation. The explanations exist even if we can not 
represent them cognitively (italics mine, 2007, 33-4). 
Craver thus appears to favor an objective conception of explanation to a psychological one on 
(inter alia) the following grounds:3 
Psychologistic theories of explanation equate explanations with the psychological sense 
of understanding (which may comprise feelings of intellectual satisfaction or aha 
feelings). However, there are clear-cut instances where the (objective) explanation for a 
happening exists where no sense of understanding is possible. 
It bears mentioning that while Craver explicitly advocates an objective conception of 
explanation, his main purpose in Explaining the Brain is to elucidate the appropriate norms of 
acceptance for explanations. Once again, however, a shift to epistemic considerations requires a 
shift to some representational conception of explanation or other. Notice also that, like Hempel, 
Craver maintains that an essential characteristic of such explanations is that they be accurate. For 
instance, Ptolemy’s model of retrograde motion is, on Craver’s view, no explanation at all since 
it delivers an inaccurate description of the objective facts (20). 
2.4 Trout’s Anti-phenomenalism 
Another latter-day mechanist, J.D. Trout, worries that when evaluating explanations, too 
often “we tap into the phenomenology associated with offering the explanation, the sense of 
understanding conveyed by detailing it” (2007, 566). This strategy, he suggests, is epistemically 
pernicious, for “[t]he sense of understanding actually does harm, sometimes making us 
squeamish about accepting true claims that we don’t personally understand, and more often… 
causing us to overconfidently accept false claims because they have a kind of anecdotal or 
theoretical charm” (578). On its face, this looks a great deal like the sorts of epistemic anti-
psychologism arguments we have been considering, but Trout’s target is phenomenalism about 
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 To be fair to Craver, his chief complaint against psychological models of explanation such as Churchland’s 
prototype model, and against other representational accounts such as covering-law and unification models, is their 
insensitivity to the relevance of causal facts. Craver acknowledges that much psychological research has been done 
on how we perceive, and think, about causation (2007, 30). One might think that a theory of causation grounded in 
this kind of research (e.g., Waskan in press) might succeed where philosophical attempts to understand causation 
have failed. Craver contends, however, that we must start by determining what the actual distinction is between 
causal and non-causal sequences. I might agree were I not sufficiently impressed with how far the psychological 
research has come without the help of metaphysicians and did I not think that it is precisely because of our cognitive 
limitations that we have a concept of causation, one which I suspect largely imposes joints on nature rather than the 
reverse. 
explanation, the attempt to link explanations with conscious feelings of understanding. Trout 
introduces into the discussion a body of research suggesting that pervasive reasoning biases (viz., 
hindsight and overconfidence) frequently bring about an irrational confidence in rectitude. At 
times, he even equates feelings of understanding with these feelings of confidence (571). 
 Trout suggests that a proper theory of explanation must leave room for the fact that some 
genuine explanations fail to elicit any of the phenomenology oft-associated with explanation – 
for instance, the feeling of understanding, feelings of insight or confidence, or aha episodes. Like 
Craver, he draws attention to hyper-complex explanations, such as explanations for speciation 
and disease where the complexity of the explanation overwhelms our limited cognitive abilities. 
However, the cases of explanation he considers are clearly descriptive rather than objective in 
nature (2007, 583). He suggests,  
It is always possible to reply that these narratives may be intellectual endeavors of some 
sort, but without resources of familiarity to inspire an ‘Aha’ experience, they are not 
cases of understanding.  But this reply seems suspiciously ad hoc. They certainly behave 
like other explanations, and they are treated as such by scientists (italics mine, 584).  
In other words, Trout appears to be offering something like the following ontological anti-
phenomenalism argument: 
Psychologistic theories which equate explanations with feelings of understanding (or with 
aha episodes or feelings of insight or confidence) are belied by clear-cut instances of 
(descriptive) explanation without such feelings. 
Like the others, Trout suggests that it is of the very essence of explanations that they 
accurately represent objective facts. Accordingly, he supports Humphreys’ claim that “It is no 
explanation to provide a distorted representation of the world, and the ‘understanding’ induced 
by such incorrect models is illusory at best” (qtd. in Trout 2002, 213). For Trout, genuine 
explanation requires genuine understanding, but the latter has nothing to do with conscious 
phenomenology, as it may just as well result from implicit learning (2007, 581). He sums up his 
own “objectivist, ontic, account” of explanation as follows:  
Perhaps a suitably hedged description of conditions for genuine explanation will be 
useful.  Genuine understanding exists, not when the sense of understanding dawns, but 
when the following objective conditions are met: 
1. The explanandum-statement putatively understood is at least approximately true, 
2. The agent has sufficient collateral theoretical knowledge or information (explanatorily) 
relevant to that explanandum, and 
3. The explanandum-belief is produced by a reliable process, whether perceptual, 
cognitive, or social” (2007, 584). 
Though he jumps here from talk of descriptions to beliefs, it seems clear that Trout maintains 
that explanations at least sometimes comprise psychological representations and that it is of the 
essence that these beliefs accurately reveal (or at least represent) objective facts. He appears, 
moreover, to tend towards a mechanistic view of what the relevant facts are (2002, 229; 2007, 
572). 
3 THE AMTRIGUITY OF ‘EXPLANATION’ AND ‘UNDERSTANDING’ 
Though Hempel’s covering-law model would be rejected by mechanists, with whom I 
largely sympathize, the latter appear to co-opt a number of Hempel’s arguments and assumptions 
related to psychologistic theories of explanation. Most importantly, all parties discussed above 
assume that psychologistic theories of explanation at least generally equate explanations with the 
likes of aha feelings or feelings of understanding, insight, confidence, satisfaction, overcoming 
uneasiness, or familiarity.4 Let us call this set of features the commonly associated 
phenomenology of explanation (CAPE). All of the ontological arguments attempt to dissociate, 
or doubly dissociate, explanation from the CAPE, and thus purport that explanation is not to be 
identified in any way with the CAPE. The epistemic arguments all purport that the CAPE is 
irrelevant to the evaluation of explanations. What, then, are we to make of these arguments? My 
own interests lie primarily with the ontological question of what sorts of things explanations are, 
so I begin with an assessment of the ontological arguments.  
3.1 Ontological Arguments Reconsidered 
It should be clear enough from the preceding discussion that “[t]he radical ambiguities of 
“explanation” and “understanding” create almost endless opportunities for obfuscation and 
confusion” (Salmon 1998, 9). I would contend, moreover, that all of the ontological arguments 
exploit the ambiguities of both terms.  
To see why, notice first that there are, both in scientific and everyday contexts, at least 
three different ways in which we commonly use ‘explanation.’ Consider, for instance, the 
various evolutionary explanations that have been offered for the fact that humans are distinct 
from other primates in being relatively furless. In The Naked Ape, zoologist Desmond Morris 
suggests that the trait may have come about because our ancestors once lived along a tropical 
shoreline and that our furless physique enabled us to swim and gather submerged bounty such as 
shellfish. This would also account for other unique characteristics, such as our having a sub-
cutaneous, blubber-like layer and the fact that we take to the water well, even very early in life. 
When discussing origins of human furlessness, one might say, “There is an aquatic-ape 
explanation for human furlessness on page thirty-seven of The Naked Ape.” Here we may well be 
using ‘explanation’ to refer to a description of the possible cause of furlessness. On the other 
hand, if we took it to be established fact that the trait evolved as a way of cooling humans on a 
hot, dry savanna, we might say, “The explanation is that losing fur prevented overheating on the 
hot, dry savannah.” Here we appear to be using ‘explanation’ in the objective-factual sense of the 
term. 
There is, however, a third sense of the term that is notably absent from discussions of 
explanation in mainstream philosophy of science. Consider, for instance, that Morris entertains a 
number of further ways of making sense of furlessness, such as that it might have facilitated 
removal of parasites, it might have helped our ancestors to avoid disease when picking through 
carrion, or it might have prevented our fire-wielding ancestors from combusting. Someone else, 
let us call him Gould, might have knowledge of all such proposals but view them as hopelessly 
unconstrained by the available evidence. He might, in fact, be suspicious of the lot of them, 
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 Hempel talks of empathy, but I will drop this feeling from the discussion. Empathy, or something like it, may turn 
out to play a role in explanations for animate behaviors, particularly those of other people (see Waskan 2006). There 
may even be two distinct psychological systems for animate and inanimate explanations. If this is so, then it will 
complicate our full account of the nature of explanations for why and how happenings occur.  
viewing them all as plausible-sounding, Kiplingean just-so stories. It seems not infelicitous to 
say, in that case, “Morris has a number of explanations for furlessness,” or “Gould has a number 
of explanations for furlessness, but he has no confidence in any of them.” 
Consider, also, that we commonly use ‘explanation’ in a similar way in everyday contexts. 
For instance, one who has seen the movie Castaway might recall Tom Hank’s character, Chuck 
Noland, and his first night on the deserted island. Noland’s attempt at sleep was disturbed by 
thumping noises that were coming from the jungle at irregular intervals. Noland began yelling at 
them, and, though he never said a word, he appeared at that point to have an explanation for the 
noises. He believed that they were, or might have been, caused by the island’s other inhabitants. 
The next morning, however, as Noland walked among the palm trees, he saw and heard coconuts 
hitting the ground. Once again, though he never said so out loud, it was clear at that point that he 
had come to have a very different explanation for the frightening sounds, as did we silent 
spectators. We often use ‘explanation’ in these contexts to refer to something that can be had 
without ever being described and for something that may even be quite mistaken. This last part is 
obviously in tension with the aforementioned assumption that accuracy is essential. I will contest 
this assumption momentarily, but notice for now that to have an explanation in such contexts 
seems to be something along the lines of having a belief about what may have produced the 
happening in question. There seems, in other words, to be a psychological sense of the term as 
well. The psychological events involved have become the focus of psychological studies of 
explanation. 
Notice also that all of the ontological arguments we have considered attempt to establish 
that explanations are not to be identified with the CAPE on the grounds that there are clear-cut 
cases of explanation where (some or all of) the CAPE is absent and vice versa. To make these 
arguments as strong as possible, let us grant that in the former cases none of the CAPE is present 
and in the latter all of it is. Even granting this, the arguments are seriously flawed, for all of the 
clear-cut cases in question are either cases of descriptive explanations (e.g., an argument 
concerning the free-fall of some body or a hyper-complex description of speciation) or of 
objective explanations (e.g., the atmospheric causes of weather phenomena or the hyper-complex 
neurophysiological mechanisms responsible for some phenomenon). With as much force, one 
might argue that explanations just are psychological given that there are cases of explanation 
without either descriptions or accuracy (e.g., Noland’s initial explanation for the noises).5 To 
dissociate psychological explanations from objective ones would, admittedly, require that we 
first reject the assumption that psychological explanations are necessarily accurate.6 For now 
suffice it to say that the problem with all of the ontological arguments is that ‘explanation’ is, at 
the very least, amtriguous. Because of this, we should, modulo the accuracy assumption, be 
somewhat surprised if there were not clear-cut cases in which one sense of the term applies but 
not the rest. There is, however, nothing here that should lead us to suppose that explanations just 
are one of the following: objective, descriptive, or psychological. Moreover, for all the 
ontological arguments tell us, it may yet be that explanation, in the psychological sense, really is 
identical with at least part of the CAPE. Before determining whether or not this is so, let us 
consider, at long last, whether or not explanations must be accurate.  
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 Some foolish individuals have, in fact, argued as much (Waskan 2006). 
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 I use ‘psychological explanation’ in what follows to talk about the referent of the psychological sense of 
‘explanation.’  
Recall, again, that the assumption that accuracy is essential clearly has to do with 
representational conceptions of explanation (e.g., descriptive or psychological). This assumption 
has been widespread from inception of the philosophical debate about explanations, but it is an 
ill-motivated (as near as I can tell) and fairly radical departure from common usage. To see why, 
consider that if we, qua folk or scientists, commonly assumed that accuracy were essential, then 
we would presumably avoid using expressions such as “bad explanation,” “false explanation,” 
“faulty explanation,” “defective explanation.” In point of fact, even those who assume the 
necessity of accuracy have a hard time avoiding such expressions, but by their lights these 
expressions appear oxymoronic. By the same token, it would be redundant to speak of good, 
true, or accurate explanations, as we often do. 
Perhaps more importantly, in everyday life and in science, we frequently take ourselves 
and others to possess multiple, competing explanations for happenings, as was illustrated above 
with regard to human furlessness. At the very heart of the scientific enterprise is the process of 
making inferences as to which of a number of often radically inconsistent explanations is best. 
For instance, consider the following two claims: 
The extinction of the dinosaurs was primarily precipitated by a massive, endogenous (to 
Earth) volcanic event in the region of the Indian subcontinent. 
The extinction of the dinosaurs was primarily precipitated by the impact of a massive 
asteroid that occurred in the Yucatan region. 
It seems no violation of our normal linguistic practices to suggest that both of these are, and give 
voice to, genuine explanations. This, again, is not to be expected on the view that 
representational explanations are necessarily accurate. One might also note that even if, as some 
take to be the lesson of the pessimistic induction, scientist of today are radically mistaken, we 
would still want to say that they have succeeded in generating many perfectly genuine 
explanations (de Regt 2004, 107). 
The claim that we (by which I mean layfolk and scientists alike) do not normally take 
accuracy to be an essential feature of representational explanations is an empirical one that must 
itself ultimately be adjudicated through the use of scientific methods. I have simply tried here to 
marshal some preliminary, intuitive evidence in its favor. Henceforth I will assume that accuracy 
is not essential (though it will be far from devastating for my view if I am mistaken). Granting 
this, one finds it easy to pull psychological explanation apart from the CAPE. I will revisit the 
other two conceptions in closing. 
First let us see whether or not the CAPE is, in whole or in part, sufficient for explanation. 
Taking the components of the CAPE individually, the task appears quite tractable. Consider, for 
instance, the oft-mentioned aha experience. We frequently undergo it for reasons that have 
nothing to do with explanations. This happens, for instance, when we feel that we have 
discovered the solution to a math problem, a riddle, or a design problem. Terms like “Eureka!” 
(as commonly used) and “Aha!” appear to give voice to the feeling of having made a discovery, 
and they usually occur only at the moment of discovery. These feelings profoundly diminish 
with each subsequent pass of revisiting the discovery. [Notice also that when the same discovery 
is imparted to us by another, we instead undergo an Ooooh moment.] 
 It may be possible to establish, however, that even the entire CAPE is insufficient for 
psychological explanation. The full array of such feelings seems, for instance, to be induced at 
times by neural malfunctions of both endogenous and exogenous origins. To take a semi-
fictitious example, in A Beautiful Mind, John Nash appears to have these feelings, with great 
vivacity, though in the clear light of day he realizes that he has been completely delusional. He 
finds that the record of his supposed discovery, which would have been mathematical in nature, 
is meaningless gibberish. Those who take psychedelics have been known to undergo such 
episodes as well. 
 We might, on the other hand, have one or more explanations without undergoing any of 
these feelings at all. We may, as already mentioned, possess some radically inconsistent 
explanations for a happening but lack the conviction that any of them is right. In such a case, we 
may fail to have any aha feelings or feelings of understanding, insight, confidence, satisfaction, 
overcoming uneasiness, or familiarity. At the very least, it seems not incoherent that this could 
happen, but it should if any part of the CAPE were necessary for psychological explanation. 
 We could keep going like this, but I am happy to grant that the CAPE is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for psychological explanation, nor descriptive or objective. After all, were it 
constitutive of explanation on any sense of the term, it would presumably be constitutive of 
explanation in the psychological sense. Yet it appears not to be. Thus, although all of the 
ontological arguments considered here trade on an equivocation, there is a kernel of truth to 
them. One naturally wonders, then, what this tells us about psychological explanations. 
 Upon doubly dissociating explanation from the CAPE, some have suggested that 
explanations are simply not psychological. However, we do commonly use ‘explanation’ in a 
non-descriptive, non-objective, apparently psychological sense. In fact, what we have just done 
is doubly dissociate the CAPE from psychological explanations. More plausible, then, is Trout’s 
suggestion that conscious feelings and phenomenology are not constitutive of psychological 
explanations. There is, however, a third option: One might argue that some form of extra-CAPE 
phenomenology is constitutive. This option has, I believe, considerable plausibility. 
But what could the missing, essential phenomenological ingredient be? I think it may be 
understanding after all. We appear to have been improperly turned away from the consideration 
of understanding as a possible constituent of psychological explanation by the amtriguity of 
‘understanding.’ There is, as already agreed, genuine understanding of how or why simpliciter. 
To have this, we must be right. Yet, rectitude, I have also argued, is not necessary for 
explanation on any sense of the term. We may have, and proffer, explanations that range from 
being mildly inaccurate to wildly so. There is, in addition, the mere feeling that we understand, 
which seems at times to occur without psychological explanation and vice versa. It seems, 
moreover, to require confidence in rectitude, but we may have explanations without this as well.  
There is, however, also such a thing as understanding of how or why possibly. This, 
according to Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), is precisely what mechanistic, descriptive 
explanations supply. They claim: 
Mechanism descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually things work. 
Intelligibility arises not from an explanation's correctness, but rather from an elucidative 
relation between the explanans (the set-up conditions and intermediate entities and 
activities) and the explanandum (the termination condition or the phenomenon to be 
explained)...." (pp. 21). 
Understanding how or why possibly is, as they intimate, sometimes known as finding a 
happening understandable, comprehensible or intelligible (see Machamer 1998; Waskan 2006, 
2008). To achieve this state, we need have neither confidence in rectitude nor rectitude itself 
(i.e., we need not actually understand). However, there is more to it than intelligibility than the 
mere feeling that sometimes tracks it. While the feeling may be had without explanation and vice 
versa, it is exceedingly difficult to find, or even imagine, a case where one genuinely has an 
explanation for a happening and yet does not understand how or why it might have occurred, and 
it is equally difficult to find or imagine cases where someone genuinely understands how or why 
possibly and yet lacks an explanation. 
As a fellow mechanist, I am inclined towards the view that understanding of how or why 
possibly involves, at least where inanimate explanations are concerned, knowledge of how the 
spatial, temporal, and causal arrangement of parts might conspire to produce the happening that 
interests us. Much of my own research on explanation has focused on the matter of precisely 
what is involved in finding a happening mechanistically intelligible. The study of the 
psychological underpinnings for intelligibility has, I believe, potential to tell us much about what 
explanations are, in all three senses, and about the manner in which we evaluate them. 
3.2 The Nature, and Epistemic Import, of Intelligibility 
One of the most perplexing facts about understanding the mechanisms by which a 
happening may have been produced is that, in virtue of this form of understanding, we are 
blessed with open-ended knowledge of both the implications of those mechanisms being as we 
envision them and of the possible ways in which those implications might be defeated. These 
sorts of knowledge obviously lie at the very core of the scientific activity of testing explanatory 
hypotheses (Waskan 2006, 2008).  
The first sort of knowledge enables us to devise, and comprehend rationale for, tests. If 
explanations only had implications regarding the happening in question, we would be hard 
pressed to find compelling reasons for preferring one to another. But explanations typically have 
boundless further ramifications, boundless surplus meaning, as it is sometimes called 
(MacCorquodale & Meehl 1948). The second sort enables us to devise, and comprehend, various 
ways of hanging onto the explanations we favor even when their apparent implications are not 
born out. One important way of rationalizing this form of intransigence is to determine ways in 
which the envisioned mechananism-implication relation might be defeated. To be sure, at the 
level of local rationality this form of activity can be driven by epistemically pernicious biases 
such as over-confidence (Trout 2007). However, at the more global level of communities of 
scientists, it is precisely our ability to come up with countless reasons for hanging onto our 
explanations that ensures that there are always many dogs in the hunt (see Lakatos 1970). Put 
differently, our ability to rationalize our intransigence ensures existence of multiple trajectories 
through accuracy space and helps science avoid getting trapped in local minima.  
What I propose, in earlier work, is a unified account of what, on my view, is explicit 
knowledge of possible productive mechanisms (i.e., an account of intelligibility) and tacit 
knowledge of an explanations boundless implications and defeaters (Waskan 2006, 2008, 2010). 
To tie this proposal back to the discussion of Hempel with which we started, recall that Hempel 
abstracted not just from facts about human psychology and language use, but he also abstracted 
from the specific contents of descriptive explanations and attempted to discern their bare form 
with the aid of techniques of inductive and deductive logic. This second abstraction itself leads, I 
believe, to be a local minimum as concerns the study of explanations. 
 As you may know, the study of explanation in philosophy began as logical positivism lost 
its grip, not just on physics, but on psychology. There too it became allowable to study and talk 
about, complicated theoretical underpinnings form human behavior. At this point, the study of 
explanation got underway, as did the study of human ratiocination more generally. Of particular 
interest in the latter respect were the many attempts, in the new field of A.I., to account for 
human mechanical reasoning (e.g., in the service of planning) by, in essence, letting abstract 
principles of formal logic shoulder the inferential load. It would not take long for researchers in 
A.I. to see that in order to get a system to know what we know about the implications of 
mechanisms, one would need to build into the system an explicit specification of not just the 
countless implications of alterations to a system, but of the countless ways in which each 
implication might be defeated. Even with regard to simple ‘toy worlds,’ this often turns into an 
intractable task. This is, in essence, the notorious frame problem of A.I. (McCarthy and Hayes 
1969; also see McCarthy 1986 and Janlert 1996).7 There is simply no way, where such an 
explicit specification is demanded – that is, through use of an “extrinsic” representational scheme 
(Palmer 1978) –for any finite system to embody this kind of boundless knowledge. 
 An alternative is to suppose that we humans utilize intrinsic representations. An intrinsic 
representation is one such that side effects of alterations to representation automatically mirror 
side effects of alterations to represented system (see Haugeland 1987). The paradigm of an 
intrinsic representation of a mechanism is a scale model. Constructing a scale model of a 
mechanism obviates an antecedent and explicit specification of consequences and their possible 
defeaters. To determine these, one simply alters the model in the relevant ways and lets the 
consequences play out. Indeed, about the same time Hempel began defending his logic-based 
model of explanation in philosophy, Craik (1952) proposed, in The Nature of Explanation, that 
humans possess explanations in virtue of carrying “a 'small-scale model' of external reality” in 
their heads. 
  An economical alternative to constructing scale models is to construct what are widely 
known as finite element models. Such models were pioneered in fields like mechanical 
engineering, but they are now used widely throughout engineering and are increasingly used by 
scientists. Finite element models are typically implemented using the vast, parallel number-
crunching capabilities of supercomputers and, ultimately, they supply an existence-proof that 
brains, too, are capable of harboring and manipulating non-sentential intrinsic models (Waskan 
2003). Such models, I maintain, constitute our core inference engine for determining the 
countless implications of mechanisms and their countless defeaters, both for prospective 
planning ends and retrospective explanatory ones.8 
The resulting account of explanation (i.e., in the psychological sense), which I term the 
model model, is as follows: 
                                                 
7
 This is not to be confused with Dennett’s version of the frame problem, which has more to do with time, or with 
Fodor’s, which has to do with the holistic nature of our entire belief system. With regard to the latter, see Waskan & 
Bechtel (1997). 
8
 It is, I would argue, through our possession of these models that we are, as de Regt puts it, able to “recognize 
qualitatively characteristic consequences of [an explanation] without performing exact calculations” (in press). As 
de Regt too recognizes that this sort of knowledge plays an important role in the evaluation of explanations. 
“to have an [inanimate] explanation is to have the belief that a certain mechanism is, or 
may be, responsible for producing some happening, where such beliefs are constituted by 
mental representations [viz., intrinsic cognitive models] of those mechanisms. It is largely 
in virtue of our awareness of the information conveyed by these representations that 
events and physical regularities are rendered intelligible” (Waskan 2008, 262).9 
I contend, further, that these “occurrent beliefs… endow us with tacit knowledge of many kinds 
of evaluatively relevant information” (272) – that is, of the sort discussed above. 
 Regarding the ontological arguments, then, my claim is that explanations for happenings 
in the psychological sense are at least plausibly construed as fully dissociable from the CAPE. 
However, that does not mean that conscious awareness is not constitutive of such explanations. 
What is constitutive is that we are aware of the mechanisms that may have produced the 
happening in question. This occurs, I contend, through occurrent beliefs that comprise intrinsic 
cognitive models of mechanisms. 
As for the epistemic arguments, they all suggest that the presence of the CAPE is 
irrelevant to the evaluation of (representational) explanations. This may be so, but there are other 
forms of awareness that do bear on the evaluation of explanations. The mere having of an 
explanation is, of course, no reason for thinking that it is the right explanation. Something that is 
evaluatively relevant, however, is that we are aware of the implications of our explanations and 
whether or not they are (i.e., directly or indirectly in terms of their implications) borne out by 
experience. If they are not, we may try to find ways in which those implications might have been 
defeated. This is not the whole of what matters for evaluation, but it is quite central to the 
evaluative process, and the proposal that it occurs through the manipulation of intrinsic cognitive 
models enables us to understand, for the first time, from whence this boundless evaluative 
information issues. Our own intrinsic non-sentential models are, on this view, the original basis 
for explanations, though, as discussed further below, to overcome limitations of memory we 
often rely upon external non-sentential intrinsic models (and sometimes extrinsic ones) as a 
prosthetic. 
 Beyond general objections to the mechanistic approach, one serious concern about the 
specific account of explanation offered here stems from the fact psychological explanations are 
here construed as a species of belief. Yet we often use belief in both an occurrent sense (i.e., 
where we are consciously entertaining the belief) and a dispositional sense. This likely reflects, 
or is some imperfect shadow of, the very real distinction between working and longer-term forms 
of memory. By the same token, we often take someone to have an explanation even if they are 
not thinking about it currently. We may, then, need to distinguish between two sub-senses of 
                                                 
9
 There are probably two distinct systems for processing inanimate and intentional explanations, though the former 
has historically been applied in order to understand inanimate behaviors and the latter is often applied to intentional 
behaviors. My focus here is on inanimate explanations, where I believe the mechanistic approach is a good fit. The 
inanimate-explanation system, on my view, delivers intrinsic models of how the spatial, temporal, and causal 
arrangements of extended parts produce the happenings that interest us. Positing intrinsic representations is, I 
maintain, also required with regard to explanations for intentional behaviors (Waskan 2006). One plausible solution 
is that we use ourselves as intrinsic models for others. To be more inclusive, perhaps I should have formulated the 
model model more generically as follows: To have an explanation for a happening is to have an intrinsic cognitive 
model of what may have produced it. To have an explanation is to have the belief that a certain process is, or may 
be, responsible for producing some happening, where such beliefs are constituted by intrinsic cognitive models of 
those processes. 
‘explanation’ in the psychological sense. Even so, an essential feature of dispositional beliefs is 
their relationship to occurrent ones, though the converse does not hold. Thus, though we may 
have an explanation for a happening at time t without thinking about it at t, plausibly what makes 
it an explanation has to do with the fact that were we to recall it from memory we would thereby 
understand how or why possibly that happening occurred. 
3.3 Further Grounds for Going Psychologistic 
 There may, moreover, be important parallels between, on the one hand, the relationship 
between occurrent explanations and dispositional ones and, on the other, the relationship 
between occurrent explanations and both descriptive and ontic ones. That is to say, these other 
forms of explanation may themselves be constituted in a way by occurrent beliefs about how or 
why possibly. As you will recall, some attempt to dissociate explanations from conscious 
psychological facts by pointing to cases of descriptive explanation that fail to generate feelings 
of understanding in some (Hempel 1965) or in all (Trout 2007). A similar point could be made 
regarding intelligibility. Consider, for instance, the aquatic-ape explanation on page 37 of in The 
Naked Ape. The explanation is there, in the book, even if nobody is reading, or thinking about it. 
Similarly, as Trout suggests, a hyper-complex model will sometimes involve so many factors 
that “memory could not hold them all at once” (2007, 583). In such cases, it may, at least for 
humans as they now are, be impossible for such models to render the happenings of which they 
are models intelligible to us. To the extent that we do take them to be explanations (an empirical 
matter), one might conclude that what makes for a descriptive explanation has nothing to do with 
human psychology. But that may, for various reasons, be too hasty.  
It may be that the scientists who reputedly treat these descriptions as explanations only do 
so insofar as they have found some way to re-represent them in ways that compresses much of 
the complexity, albeit at the expense of important details, so as to in fact render the happenings 
in question intelligible. Consider, for instance, Elman’s neural network models of grammar 
learning (REF). Like virtually everyone who works with large connectionist systems, Elman tries 
to understand how his work through statistical analyses (e.g., principle component analysis), 
many of which supply comprehensible graphical representations of their functioning. Indeed, 
when thinking about and discussing such models, one commonly finds invoked analogies and 
metaphors grounded in happenings that are comprehensible (e.g., partitioning of state space). 
Even bracketing all of this, it may be that intelligibility is an essential part of what it 
means for a description or external model to be an explanation. It could turn out that we (qua 
folk or scientists) regard these external representations as explanations only insofar as were one 
to fully comprehend (i.e., in the linguistic sense) the descriptions they comprise, one would 
thereby find the happening intelligible. Similar considerations may apply in the case of objective 
explanations. It may be that we regard some set of objective facts (e.g., the sorts of hyper-
complex objective facts mentioned by Craver) as an explanation for a happening only insofar as 
were one to be aware of those facts, one would thereby find the happening intelligible. If this is 
right, then a better grasp of what it is, psychologically speaking, to find a happening intelligible 
may tell us a great deal about what explanations are, in all three senses of the term discussed 
herein. Moreover, scarcely a philosophical discussion is to be found that does not invoke the 
likes of revealing, exposing, showing, enabling us to see, laying bare, elucidating, and so on 
(Waskan 2006; Wright and Bechtel 2007). A better understanding of intelligibility may help us 
to discharge these (often visuospatial and perceptual) metaphors. 
If the above proposal regarding the subtle connection between intelligibility and the 
different conceptions of explanations is on the right track, it raises a host of further questions and 
suggests many avenues of further study. One wonders to whom the ‘one’ refers in the above 
analyses. Do we, qua folk or scientists, require that an explanation must be capable of rendering 
a happening intelligible to actual humans as they now exist? As we have seen, often mentioned 
are the quantitative limits of human memory and the limits they impose upon how much 
complexity we can ‘wrap our heads around.’ Left untouched, however, are questions of how 
qualitative differences in how a being conceives of the world affect our judgments. Perhaps we 
would count something an explanation for a happening so long as, by comprehending or 
becoming aware of it, that happening would be rendered intelligible to any being, even a deity, 
that comprehended or was aware of it. Against this view, one does find in the historical record 
cases where a model’s qualitative incomprehensibility led many to deny that any explanations 
were on offer (Waskan 2006, 270-1). In any case, I leave these as open empirical questions to be 
resolved by further analysis, by culling the historical record, and by direct experimental study. 
Indeed, in the promise of this last method, we find further grounds for going 
psychologistic, specifically with regard to the study of how and why we apply the term 
‘explanation’ in the various ways that we do. As the above arguments show, a significant portion 
of the discussion of explanations is driven by judgments, whether of folk, philosophers, or 
scientists, about whether or not to apply the term to particular cases. Presumably the judgments 
we make stem in large part from our tacit command of information, gathered throughout our 
lives, about the socioculturally (or sociosubculturally) accepted standards for applying the term, 
from what is sometimes called a ‘concept.’ Empirical research on our concepts of explanation 
can be expected to tell us more about the nature and structure of these concepts. However, 
whether we study explanation through standard analytic techniques or through more scientific 
methods (e.g., of experimental philosophy), we are to some extent relegated to hoping that our 
individual or shared concepts of explanation are produced by, and somehow mirror, some more 
objective sets of facts (see Goldman & Pust 2002). 
It may be, however, that in the case of explanation we can climb right up to the 
headwaters of this river and paddle our way back down. For instance, perhaps it is possible to 
discern the actual psychological underpinnings for beliefs about how and why possibly, the 
actual psychological basis for intelligibility. From here we may gain a view of the origins 
concept of psychological explanation gleaned from our imperfect apprehension of these 
psychological goings-on and revealed by philosophical and (eventually) experimental 
techniques. Knowing all of this will ultimately help us to better understand precisely why folk, 
scientists, or philosophers have the intuitions about cases that they do. This general sort of 
thinking is what led me to say, some while back, that “the Model model is a mechanistic model 
of the psychological underpinnings for explanation and, thereby, for our philosophical… 
intuitions concerning the nature of explanation” (Waskan 2006). Then my target was explanation 
in the psychological sense. However, if my proposal about the role played by intelligibility in the 
other two concepts of explanation (i.e., descriptive and objective) is on target, then this line of 
inquiry may help to reveal why we apply all three senses of the term ‘explanation’ in the precise 
ways that we do. 
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